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Empirical Article
Psychological trauma may affect autobiographical mem-
ory function in a number of ways (Brewin, Dalgleish, & 
Joseph, 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Moore & Zoellner, 
2007). Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), one of the 
most common disorders after trauma, has been charac-
terized primarily as a disorder of memory (McNally, 
2006). Memory difficulties in PTSD have been observed 
for retrieving both memories of the actual trauma (i.e., 
difficulties retrieving a coherent organized memory of 
the traumatic event) and autobiographical memories 
unrelated to the trauma. A bias to recall autobiographical 
memories in a general rather than specific way has been 
observed in PTSD (Kleim & Ehlers, 2008; McNally, Lasko, 
Macklin, & Pitman, 1995; Moore & Zoellner, 2007). This 
bias toward overgeneral memory (OGM) recall may serve 
protective functions such as attenuating painful emotions 
associated with past emotional memories and may 
develop early in life in individuals exposed to childhood 
trauma (Dalgleish et al., 2003; Kuyken & Brewin, 1995). 
Impaired executive function and ruminative thinking 
may further contribute to OGM (Williams et al., 2007).
This ability to retrieve specific memories from one’s 
past is important for visualizing one’s future, a process 
that has been referred to as future “mental time travel” 
(Tulving, 2002). The capacity to “pre-experience” future 
episodic events in our minds has attracted much recent 
scientific attention, including neuroimaging studies of the 
“prospective brain” (Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007). 
These studies suggest that imagining future events 
recruits many of the same neural processes involved in 
the recall of past autobiographical memories (Szpunar, 
Watson, & McDermott, 2007). Imagining future episodes 
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Abstract
Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), one of the most common disorders following trauma, has been associated with 
a tendency to remember past personal memories in a nonspecific, overgeneral way. The present study investigated 
whether such a bias also applies to projections of future personal events. Trauma survivors (N = 50) generated brief 
descriptions of imagined future experiences in response to positive and negative cues in a future-based Autobiographical 
Memory Test. Survivors with PTSD imagined fewer specific future events in response to positive, but not to negative, 
cues, compared to those without PTSD. This effect was independent of comorbid major depression. Reduced memory 
specificity in response to positive cues was related to appraisals of foreshortened future and permanent change. 
Training to enhance specificity of future projections may be helpful in PTSD and protect against potentially toxic 
effects of autobiographical memory overgenerality.
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may depend on the ability to recall details from past 
events and to flexibly reconstruct these details to simu-
late novel future images and scenarios (Schacter et al., 
2007).
This raises the question of whether an impaired ability 
to imagine future events may be related to posttrauma 
psychopathology. One of the symptoms of PTSD is a 
sense of foreshortened future, including a feeling that 
one will not live long enough to experience key events 
within a normal life cycle, hence affecting life in numer-
ous areas, including the manner in which one plans for 
the future. The cognitive processes that underlie this 
problem are unclear. Negative trauma-related appraisals, 
such as the belief that future traumatic events are likely 
to happen or that one is permanently changed for the 
worse by the trauma, may play an important role (Ehlers 
& Clark, 2000). Such patterns of thinking may maintain a 
sense of current threat and contribute to PTSD. Given the 
interdependence between future projections and the 
recall of past autobiographical events, individuals with 
PTSD may be impaired in generating specific future sim-
ulations. Overgeneral, nonspecific simulation of future 
events has been found in depression (Williams, 1996; 
Williams et al., 2007), schizophrenia (D’Argembeau, 
Raffard, & Van der Linden, 2008), and borderline person-
ality disorder (Kremers, Spinhoven, Van der Does, & Van 
Dyck, 2006) as well as in adults with traumatic grief 
(MacCallum & Bryant, 2011b).
The purpose of the present study is to investigate the 
specificity of episodic future events generated by trauma 
survivors. Based on previous research documenting 
OGM for past events in PTSD, the observation that “the 
extent that inability to retrieve episodes from the past 
hampers one’s ability to envision the future (i.e., future 
foreshortening)” (McNally, Litz, Prassas, Shin, & Weathers, 
1994), and an initial report of future overgenerality in a 
small group of American combat veterans from the wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan (Brown et al., 2013), we hypoth-
esized that in a larger group of trauma survivors, PTSD 
would be associated with reduced specificity in imagin-
ing future events. Hampered specific future thinking may 
be one display of a foreshortened sense of future in those 
who think that the trauma has cut short their lives or that 
aspirations and life goals that had been important to 
them will no longer be reachable after the trauma. Those 
who believe that they have permanently changed since 
the trauma may find it particularly difficult to imagine 
specific positive personal future events. We thus hypoth-
esized that reduced future specificity would be related to 
a greater perception of permanent change and foreshort-
ened future after trauma and prior exposure to a greater 
number of traumas and childhood traumas. To our 
knowledge, this is the first study to investigate future 
event specificity in a mixed sample of trauma survivors 
and to examine some of the correlates of future event 
specificity.
Method
Participants
Assault and motor vehicle accident (MVA) survivors were 
recruited through flyers posted around the community 
and local advertisements. Inclusion criteria, assessed over 
the phone, included (a) experience of an assault or MVA 
that met the trauma A1 criterion specified in the fourth 
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric 
Association [APA], 1994), (b) a minimum age of 18 years, 
and (c) mastery of written and spoken English to com-
plete assessment and questionnaires. Participants with 
current psychosis and substance dependence as well as 
those who could not remember the event (e.g., because 
of a head injury) were excluded. Of 96 individuals inter-
viewed on the phone, 61 met these inclusion criteria and 
were invited to a research session. A total of 52 partici-
pants attended, 50 of whom completed the Autobio-
graphical Memory Test Future (AMT-f). Trauma exposure 
ranged between 1.5 months and 44 years prior to the 
study (M = 4.7 years). Demographic and clinical charac-
teristics are displayed in Table 1. The PTSD and non-
PTSD groups did not differ in any of these characteristics 
except PTSD and depression symptom severity and 
PTSD-characteristic appraisals of permanent change and 
foreshortened future.
Measures
AMT-f.  The AMT-f was administered individually fol-
lowing standard procedures. Participants saw 12 cue 
words (6 positive words: cheer, pleased, relieved, lively, 
glorious, peaceful; 6 negative words: worse, guilty, hope-
less, awful, grave, ugly). Cues were derived from earlier 
studies (Kleim & Ehlers, 2008) and presented in random 
order on a computer screen. The participants’ task was to 
generate, and briefly describe, a specific personal event 
relating to the participants’ future in response to each cue 
word. Specific future events were explained as important 
or trivial events that would happen on a particular day, 
lasting no longer than a day. Examples of appropriate 
specific future events and inappropriate general events 
were given, and participants had the opportunity to prac-
tice the task. Participants were allowed a maximum of 
1 minute to retrieve a specific future personal event for 
each word. If they did not provide a response in that 
time, this was scored as an omission and counted as a 
nonspecific response. Responses were tape-recorded 
and later transcribed and scored for the total number of 
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first personal future events that were specific and for 
their trauma-relatedness. A future event was rated as 
trauma-related when it involved the trauma or its conse-
quences (e.g., “When I will look into the mirror tomor-
row morning and see the scar from the assault”). A 
psychologist with a bachelor’s degree in psychology 
training for a doctorate in clinical psychology rated all 
memories and was blind to the participants’ diagnostic 
status. A second independent rater scored a random sam-
ple of 35 oral AMT-f responses; there was good interrater 
agreement for the categorization of specific versus non-
specific responses (κ = .81).
Structured Clinical Interviews
PTSD and major depression diagnoses.  PTSD diag-
nosis was established with a standard structured clinical 
interview, the Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale (Blake 
et al., 1995). The interviewer, a trained psychologist with 
a bachelor’s degree in psychology, rated each of the 
PTSD symptoms for frequency and for intensity, each on 
a scale from 0 to 4. PTSD was rated as present if the par-
ticipant reported the number of symptoms specified in 
DSM-IV (APA, 1994). Major depression diagnosis was 
assessed with the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-
IV (First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1996). Interrater 
reliability was high (PTSD: κ = .80; major depression: 
κ = .80 based on 10 interviews; 2 raters who were each 
uninformed as to the other rater’s diagnoses).
Questionnaires and Other Measures
Permanent change.  Permanent change was assessed 
with a four-item subscale from the Posttraumatic Cogni-
tion Inventory (PTCI; Foa, Ehlers, Clark, Tolin, & Orsillo, 
1999). An example item is “I have permanently changed 
for the worse.” The PTCI measures trauma-related 
thoughts and beliefs that have been shown to discrimi-
nate well between trauma survivors with and without 
PTSD. It has been shown to have good internal consis-
tency and retest reliability (α = .88 for the subscale in the 
current sample). The permanent change scale has been 
Table 1.  Sample Characteristics (N = 50)
PTSD (n = 30)
Non-PTSD  
(n = 20)  
Variable  n % n % Sign. diff.
Sex (Male) 10 33.3 10 50.0 ns
Ethnicity (Caucasian) 14 46.7 12 60.0 ns
Employment status
  Employed, student 17 56.6 13 65.0 ns
  Unemployed, retired 13 43.3 7 35.0 ns
Marital status
  Married/long-term relationship 15 50.0 5 25.0 ns
  Single/divorced/other 15 50.0 15 75.0 ns
Trauma type
  Assault 15 50.0 9 45.0 ns
  MVA 15 50.0 11 55.0 ns
Childhood abuse history
 Endorsed 14 46.7 6 33.3 ns
 No information   0 0 2 10.0  
  M SD M SD Sign. diff.
Age (in years) 42.3 10.6 37.0 13.7 ns
Years of education (in years) 14.2 2.8 14.8 3.2 ns
Time since trauma (in years) 4.1 7.1 5.8 9.6 ns
Number of adult traumas 6.8 3.7 5.4 3.0 ns
PTSD symptom severity (PDS) 29.0 11.3 11.3 7.8 F = 36.2, p < .001
Foreshortened future (% endorsed) 11 39.4 1 5.0 χ2 = 7.3, p = .008
Permanent change (Range: 0–7) 3.6 1.9 1.8 1.3 F = 12.64, p = .001
Imagery ability (Range: 0–55) 41.41 8.40 39.26 9.13 ns
Note: MVA = motor vehicle accident; PDS = Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale; PTSD = posttraumatic stress disorder.
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shown to correlate with OGM (Kleim & Ehlers, 2008; 
Schönfeld & Ehlers, 2006).
Trauma and childhood abuse history.  Trauma his-
tory including childhood abuse was assessed with the 
Traumatic Life Events Questionnaire (Kubany et al., 
2000), which assesses exposure to a broad range of 17 
types of traumatic events. Participants were asked to indi-
cate whether they had experienced each event. The scale 
has been shown to possess adequate temporal stability. 
Questionnaire and structured interview versions yielded 
similar results. For the present study, we used the sum 
score indexing the number of traumatic events experi-
enced as well as endorsement of serious physical or 
emotional abuse as a child.
Verbal intelligence.  The National Adult Reading Test 
(NART; Nelson, 1991), an established measure of verbal 
intelligence, requires participants to read aloud a list of 
50 irregularly spelled words in order of increasing diffi-
culty. Responses are individually scored as correct or 
incorrect, according to their pronunciation. The number 
of words read correctly composes the final score.
Depression symptom severity.  The Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI; Beck & Steer, 1987) is a widely used, 
standardized, and normed measure of severity of depres-
sion. The BDI asks participants to decide between four 
different response choices reflecting different degrees of 
symptom severity. Items are then scored from 0 to 3, with 
the sum of the item scores representing the total BDI 
score, ranging between 0 and 63. Internal consistency in 
the present study was very good (α = .93).
PTSD symptom severity.  The Posttraumatic Diagnostic 
Scale (PDS; Foa et al., 1997) is a standardized and vali-
dated self-report measure of PTSD symptom severity that 
has been widely used with clinical and nonclinical sam-
ples of traumatized individuals. The PDS asks partici-
pants to rate 17 items regarding how much they were 
bothered by each of the PTSD symptoms specified in 
DSM-IV ranging from 0 (never) to 3 (5 times per week or 
more/very severely). Internal consistency in the present 
study was very good (α = .95).
Procedure
The study was approved by the local ethics committee. 
Participants were recruited via flyers and screened over 
the phone. If they met inclusion criteria, they were invited 
to a research session. In the session, participants 
provided some details about their traumatic event, took 
part in a diary study regarding their intrusive traumatic 
memories (to be reported elsewhere), and filled in 
questionnaires. They then completed the AMT-f. The 
diagnostic interviews followed. Participants were reim-
bursed £50 ($97) for their time and travel expenses.
Data Analysis
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS v. 
15.0) was used for all analyses. Analyses of variance were 
calculated with the generalized linear modeling proce-
dure, with diagnostic group as the between factor (e.g., 
PTSD vs. no PTSD) and AMT-f cue valence (positive vs. 
negative) as the within-subject factor. Spearman correla-
tions were calculated between specificity scores, imagery 
ability, permanent change, foreshortened future, and ver-
bal intelligence. The significance level was set at p = .05 
(one-tailed for tests of directed correlational hypotheses 
regarding the association among specificity, appraisals of 
permanent change and foreshortened future, and prior 
trauma exposure; two-tailed for hypotheses regarding 
diagnostic group differences and specificity). Standard 
measures of effect size, that is, Cohen’s d, are reported 
for significant group differences.
Results
Response Latency, Omissions, and 
Trauma-Relatedness of AMT-f Answers
Means for response latency to first specific future per-
sonal event generated and trauma-relatedness of answers 
are shown in Table 2, including statistics for significant 
results. Participants with PTSD did not differ significantly 
from those without PTSD in response latency (p = .891). 
There was a significant valence effect, with faster 
responses to positive compared to negative cues. There 
was no interaction between PTSD group and valence 
(p = .583). More omissions were produced in response 
to negative than to positive cues, overall. For trauma-
relatedness, there was a main effect of group, indicating 
that participants with PTSD produced more trauma-
related future events than did participants without PTSD. 
This effect was irrespective of cue valence, as there were 
no main effects of valence (p = .101) and no interaction 
between diagnostic group and valence (p = .791).
Future Event Specificity in Trauma 
Survivors With and Without PTSD
The mean specificity of future events generated by the 
PTSD and non-PTSD groups is shown in Table 2. The 2 
(group) × 2 (cue valence) ANOVA showed no main effect 
of diagnostic group (p = .471), but a significant main 
effect of cue valence. Overall, participants imagined more 
specific future events in response to positive (almost 60% 
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specificity) than to negative cues (28% specificity; d = 
1.08). The interaction between cue valence and group 
was significant. Although the groups did not differ in 
generating specific future events to negative cues (p = 
.355, d = 0.28), participants with PTSD produced fewer 
specific future events in response to positive cues than 
did those without PTSD (d = 0.57). The interaction 
remained significant when trauma-relatedness of AMT-f 
answers was controlled for (p = .020) and when partici-
pants whose traumatic events happened more than 
10 years ago were excluded (p = .046). Index trauma 
type (assault vs. MVA) and time since trauma were not 
significantly associated with memory specificity scores 
(p values > .278).
We also tested whether comorbid major depression 
was driving the low specificity to positive cues in PTSD. 
This was not the case. Specificity scores were almost 
identical between participants with PTSD and comorbid 
depression (n = 12) versus those with PTSD without 
comorbid depression (n = 17), M (SD)PTSD + depression = 
50.00 (27.30) versus M (SD)PTSD without comorbid depression = 
50.98 (27.31), F(1, 28) = 0.01, p = .924, d = 0.21.
Correlates of Future Event Specificity
Greater future event specificity to positive cues in the 
total sample was associated with higher imagery ability 
(r = .24, p = .044). Specificity was negatively related to a 
sense of foreshortened future (r = −.28, p = .030) and to 
perceived permanent change since their trauma (r = −.25, 
p = .041). Neither of these variables was significantly 
associated with specificity to negative cues (all ps > .071). 
Specificity to both negative and positive cues was unre-
lated to verbal intelligence as assessed by the NART (r = 
.14, p = .173) and the number of traumatic events experi-
enced (p > .455). However, childhood abuse was related 
to low specificity. Participants with a childhood abuse 
history generated fewer specific future events to positive 
cues than did those without a childhood abuse history 
(46%, SD = 43.83 specificity vs. 67%, SD = 25.97; F = 6.13, 
p = .017, d = 0.58), whereas there was no group differ-
ence for negative cues (F = 0.53, p = .470, d = 0.10).
Discussion
A considerable body of literature suggests that people 
with PTSD tend to remember personal past events in an 
overgeneral rather than specific way (Moore & Zoellner, 
2007). The present study investigated whether such a 
bias also applies to projections of future personal events. 
In line with previous research (Bryant, Sutherland, & 
Guthrie, 2007), trauma survivors with PTSD generated 
fewer specific future events to positive cues, but not to 
negative cues, than those without PTSD. A recent study 
by Brown et al. (2013) found reduced future specificity in 
American veterans in response to neutral cue words; the 
effect of cue valence thus needs further research and 
clarification. We speculate, however, that deficits in posi-
tive future episodic thinking may be particularly toxic 
and related to psychopathology. Blackwell and col-
leagues (2013) indeed found a direct association between 
dispositional optimism and positive future imagery and 
suggested positive future imagery as a cognitive target for 
treatment approaches to promoting optimism.
Table 2.  Means and Standard Deviations for AMT-f Answer Specificity, Omission, Trauma-Relatedness, and Latency as Well 
as Significant Main Effects and Interactions
PTSD  Non-PTSD  
   Positive Negative  Positive Negative  
AMT-f aspect M SD M SD M SD M SD Significant effects
Latency to first 
specific event 
generated
13.51 8.85 25.56 12.52 12.26 11.58 25.95 14.44 Valence main effect: N > P  
(F = 75.76, p < .001)
Omission 6.90 11.37 18.97 21.23 4.17 13.11 21.67 21.70 Valence main effect: P < N  
(F = 24.75, p < .001)
Trauma-relatedness 41.38 62.78 34.45 55.27 10.00 30.78 5.00 22.36 PTSD main effect: PTSD >  
non-PTSD (F = 4.92, p = .031)
Specificity of first 
future personal 
event generated
50.57 26.53 29.89 26.11 67.54 33.09 22.81 26.12 Valence main effect: P > N  
(F = 54.46, p < .001); Valence × 
PTSD: PTSD P < non-PTSD P  
(F = 7.36, p = .009)
Note: First specific event, omission, and trauma-relatedness in %, latency in seconds. AMT-f = Autobiographical Memory Test Future;  
N = response to negative cue; P = response to positive cue; PTSD = posttraumatic stress disorder.
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Reduced future specificity in response to positive cues 
was not the result of comorbid depression in our study, 
as participants with PTSD without depression showed 
the same problems in generating specific future personal 
events as did those with comorbid depression. Differences 
in specificity also remained significant after controlling 
for trauma-relatedness of the memories, thus ruling out 
the explanation that the results are from preferential 
access to trauma memories as compared to other memo-
ries in PTSD. The relationship between low future speci-
ficity and posttrauma psychopathology was further 
supported by the result that PTSD-related cognitions, a 
sense of foreshortened future, and perceived permanent 
change since the trauma were associated with low speci-
ficity in response to positive cues, although these find-
ings are preliminary, awaiting replication in future 
studies.
Participants in this study were faster to respond and 
produced fewer omissions to positive cues than to nega-
tive cues. These findings are consistent with the notion of 
a pervasive positive bias in expectations of the future 
(Carver, Scheier, & Segerstrom, 2010). Imagining the 
future in positive ways can be adaptive, and people gen-
erally seem to be better able to imagine their future in 
positive ways than in negative ways (Hoorens, Smits, & 
Shepperd, 2008). This may not be the case for people 
with PTSD, who had specific difficulties generating future 
personal events in response to positive cues compared to 
those without PTSD; specificity was reduced in PTSD by 
almost 20%. This is in accord with the finding that people 
with PTSD may view their anticipated future self less 
favorably than their pretrauma self (Brown, Buckner, & 
Hirst, 2011). Specificity to negative cues, on the other 
hand, did not differ significantly between survivors with 
versus without PTSD (see also Kremers et al., 2006). 
OGM for past autobiographical memories in PTSD, how-
ever, appears to be largely independent of cue valence in 
PTSD (Moore & Zoellner, 2007).
Impaired executive control has been suggested as a 
possible explanation for difficulties in accessing specific 
autobiographical material (Dalgleish et al., 2007). As 
future simulation relies on past memory retrieval and its 
flexible recombination, it is taxing for memory systems, 
and poor executive control in PTSD may thus lead to low 
specificity. However, impaired executive control alone 
cannot explain the difficulties with future personal event 
generation in PTSD, as we found a specific effect in 
response to positive cues, whereas executive control def-
icits should affect answers to both cue types. Moreover, 
we did not find any significant associations between our 
measure of verbal intelligence (NART) and memory 
specificity.
Another explanation for the reduced future specificity 
in PTSD in response to positive cues is that trauma 
survivors with PTSD may become “stuck” in their prior 
traumatic experience (Holman & Silver, 1998) and have 
difficulty maintaining a future orientation in the after-
math of their trauma. Such temporal orientation is pivotal 
in providing orientation and structuring people’s view of 
themselves in the world (Holman & Silver, 1998). Our 
results are in accord with these prior findings. Individuals 
without PTSD were better able to project themselves into 
the future in response to positive cues. These individuals 
may be better able to shift attention away from distress-
ing past life events and instead focus on concrete positive 
future possibilities. This seems also in line with our find-
ing that those who felt that they had permanently 
changed for the worse since the trauma and those who 
felt that their future had been cut short were less specific 
to positive cues. This parallels findings that these changes 
in self-perception also correlate with past OGM (Schönfeld 
& Ehlers, 2006). They may contribute to the effect of 
“being stuck in the past” and to the difficulty in project-
ing oneself into the future in a positive way. In addition 
to a lack of future projections, people with PTSD may be 
characterized by impoverished and trauma-oriented 
future imaginings, hence leading to a lack of future speci-
ficity to positive events.
We also assessed the relation of prior trauma exposure 
and specificity of future projections. The number of past 
traumatic events was unrelated to future specificity, sug-
gesting that one trauma may be sufficient in producing 
an overgeneral bias. However, because most participants 
reported several traumatic events, the lack of a correla-
tion may also be the result of a ceiling effect. Childhood 
abuse was, however, related to future memory specificity. 
Although we did not assess whether childhood abuse 
was part of the participants’ current re-experiencing 
symptoms, we found that those with childhood trauma 
exposure were less specific in response to positive cues 
than were those without. Childhood trauma has been 
emphasized as a possible pathway to the development 
of overgeneral autobiographical memory bias (Brennen 
et al., 2010; Williams et al., 2007). It is possible that an 
overgeneral bias for projections of the personal future 
may have already developed early in development in 
these individuals.
Our results have clinical implications. Training in con-
crete and specific past autobiographical remembering 
has been shown to decrease depressive symptoms in 
dysphoric individuals (Watkins, Baeyens, & Read, 2009). 
An intriguing question would be whether successful 
training of past memory specificity also leads to increased 
future specificity, or whether alternative ways of training 
are warranted. Recent cognitive therapeutic innovations 
include, for instance, a training program in imagining 
positive events, originally developed as a “cognitive vac-
cine” against depressed mood (Holmes, Lang, & Sha, 
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2009). Past memory specificity training has so far been 
reported mostly for individuals with depression (e.g., 
Neshat-Doost et al., 2013; Serrano et al., 2004), and future 
research needs to test whether these results extend to 
future event specificity and to individuals with PTSD. 
Moreover, it would be of interest whether future episodic 
thinking improves during treatment for PTSD. Trauma-
focused cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) for PTSD, for 
instance, may help identify and modify thoughts that ren-
der some trauma survivors prone to feel their future has 
been curtailed and that they have permanently changed 
following the trauma (Ehlers, Clark, Hackmann, McManus, 
& Fennell, 2005). Interest ingly, a recent study found that 
past OGM reduced during CBT in individuals with com-
plicated grief and that grief symptom reductions were 
associated with increased specific retrieval to positive 
cues following treatment (MacCallum & Bryant, 2011a).
The current study is not without limitations. First, our 
data are cross-sectional, and it remains unclear whether 
the deficit in future specificity in response to positive 
cues is a consequence of PTSD or a factor involved in the 
development and maintenance of the disorder (Bryant 
et al., 2007). Second, our results do not elucidate the 
mechanisms of the association between future specificity 
and PTSD. A next step would be to test candidate media-
tors of this effect in a longitudinal design. Third, further 
phenomenological characteristics of the future events 
produced by our participants may be of importance. 
Some autobiographical memory characteristics that have 
shown associations with psychopathology in previous 
research, such as the emotional valence of the generated 
events, vantage perspective, time frame, or the content of 
the imagined events, may also influence the association 
between PTSD and specificity and should be assessed by 
future studies. Fourth, as applicable to the standard AMT 
(Griffith et al., 2012), the AMT-f must be examined in 
further samples with respect to its psychometric proper-
ties, including reliability and validity, taking into account 
potential variability in methodology across the studies 
that use it. Such examinations are of particular impor-
tance before the AMT-f is administered and used in clini-
cal contexts. Finally, because of the relatively small 
sample size, results on the correlates of future event 
specificity were based on correlations in the overall sam-
ple and should thus be replicated in future studies.
To the best of our knowledge, the present study is 
among the first investigations into future mental time 
travel in trauma survivors with and without PTSD. Future 
studies are needed to replicate the effect, including pro-
spective studies investigating future specificity pretrauma 
and shortly after trauma, and its relationship to post-
trauma adaptation. Further studies into the association 
between past and future memory overgenerality are also 
needed. Future research could seek to assess additional 
factors, including potentially protective factors that pro-
mote future simulation capacity. The results could use-
fully inform on what may protect against the potentially 
toxic effects of overgenerality in past autobiographical 
memory and in future episodic simulation.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared that they had no conflicts of interest with 
respect to their authorship or the publication of this article.
Funding
The study was supported by a grant by the Economic and Social 
Research Council, ESRC, UK (RES-000-22-2544) to Birgit Kleim. 
Birgit Kleim is funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation 
(Grant PZ00P1-126597). Anke Ehlers and Richard Stott are 
funded by the Wellcome Trust (Grant 069777).
References
American Psychiatric Association. (1994). Diagnostic and sta-
tistical manual of mental disorders (4th ed.). Washington, 
DC: Author.
Beck, A. T., & Steer, R. A. (1987). Beck Depression Inventory: 
Manual. San Antonio, TX: Psychological Corporation.
Blackwell, S., Rius-Ottenheim, N., Schulte-van Maaren, Y. W. M., 
Middelkoop, I. V. E., Zitman, F. G., Spinhoven, P.,  . . . 
Giltaz, E. J. (2013). Optimism and mental imagery: A pos-
sible cognitive marker to promote well-being? Psychiatry 
Research, 206, 56–61.
Blake, D. D., Weathers, F. W., Nagy, L. M., Kaloupek, D. G., 
Gusman, F. D., Charney, D. S., & Keane, T. M. (1995). 
The development of a Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale. 
Journal of Traumatic Stress, 8(1), 75–90. doi:10.1002/
jts.2490080106.
Brennen, T., Hasanovic′, M., Zotovic′, M., Blix, I., Solheim Skar, 
A.-M., Prelic′, N. K., & Gavrilov-Jerkovic′, V. (2010). Trauma 
exposure in childhood impairs the ability to recall specific 
autobiographical memories in late adolescence. Journal of 
Traumatic Stress, 23, 240–247.
Brewin, C. R., Dalgleish, T., & Joseph, S. (1996). A dual 
representation theory of posttraumatic stress disorder. 
Psychological Review, 103(4), 670–686. doi:10.1037/0033-
295x.103.4.670
Brown, A. D., Buckner, J. P., & Hirst, W. (2011). Time, before, 
and after time: Temporal self and social appraisals in 
posttraumatic stress disorder. Journal of Behavior Therapy 
and Experimental Psychiatry, 42, 344–348. doi:10.1016/j 
.jbtep.2011.02.006
Brown, A. D., Root, J. C., Romano, T. A., Chang, L. J., Bryant, 
R. A., & Hirst, W. (2013). Overgeneralized autobiographi-
cal memory and future thinking in combat veterans with 
posttraumatic stress disorder. Journal of Behavior Therapy 
and Experimental Psychiatry, 44, 129–134. doi:10.1016/j 
.jbtep.2011.11.004.
Bryant, R. A., Sutherland, K., & Guthrie, R. M. (2007). Impaired 
specific autobiographical memory as a risk factor for 
posttraumatic stress after trauma. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 116, 837–841. doi:10.1037/0021-843x.116.4.837
 at University College London on July 28, 2015cpx.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
172 Kleim et al.
Carver, C., Scheier, M., & Segerstrom, S. (2010). Optimism. 
Clinical Psychology Review, 30, 879–889.
Dalgleish, T., Tchanturia, K., Serpell, L., Hems, S., Yiend, J., de 
Silva, P., & Treasure, J. (2003). Self-reported parental abuse 
relates to autobiographical memory style in patients with 
eating disorders. Emotion, 3, 211–222.
Dalgleish, T., Williams, J. M., Golden, A. M., Perkins, N., Barrett, 
L. F., Barnard, P. J., & Watkins, E. (2007). Reduced specific-
ity of autobiographical memory and depression: the role 
of executive control. Journal of experimental psychology. 
General, 136, 23–42.
D’Argembeau, A., Raffard, S., & Van der Linden, M. (2008). 
Remembering the past and imagining the future in schizo-
phrenia. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 117, 247–251. 
doi:10.1037/0021-843x.117.1.247
Ehlers, A., & Clark, D. M. (2000). A cognitive model of post-
traumatic stress disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 
38, 319–345.
Ehlers, A., Clark, D. M., Hackmann, A., McManus, F., & Fennell, 
M. (2005). Cognitive therapy for post-traumatic stress dis-
order: Development and evaluation. Behaviour Research 
and Therapy, 43, 413–431. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2004.03.006
First, M. B., Spitzer, R. L., Gibbon, M., & Williams, J. B. W. 
(1996). Structured Clinical Interview for DSM IV Axis I 
Disorders. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Press.
Foa, E. B., Cashman, L., Jaycox, L., & Perry, K. (1997). The 
validation of a self-report measure of posttraumatic stress 
disorder: The posttraumatic diagnostic scale. Psychological 
Assessment, 9, 445–451.
Foa, E. B., Ehlers, A., Clark, D. M., Tolin, D. F., & Orsillo, 
S. M. (1999). The Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory (PTCI): 
Development and validation. Psychological Assessment, 11, 
303–314. doi:10.1037/1040-3590.11.3.303
Griffith, J. W., Sumner, J. A., Raes, F., Barnhofer, T., Debeer, 
E., & Hermans, D. (2012). Current psychometric and 
methodological issues in the measurement of overgeneral 
autobiographical memory. Journal of Behavior Therapy 
and Experimental Psychiatry, 43, 21–31. doi:10.1016/ 
j.jbtep.2011.05.008
Holman, E. A., & Silver, R. C. (1998). Getting “stuck” in the past: 
Temporal orientation and coping with trauma. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1146–1163. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.74.5.1146
Holmes, E. A., Lang, T. J., & Shah, D. M. (2009). Developing 
interpretation bias modification as a “cognitive vaccine” 
for depressed mood: Imagining positive events makes you 
feel better than thinking about them verbally. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 118, 76–88. doi:10.1037/a0012590.
Hoorens, V., Smits, T., & Shepperd, J. A. (2008). Comparative 
optimism in the spontaneous generation of future life-
events. British Journal of Social Psychology, 47, 441–451. 
doi:10.1348/014466607X236023
Kleim, B., & Ehlers, A. (2008). Reduced autobiographical 
memory specificity predicts depression and posttraumatic 
stress disorder after recent trauma. Journal of Consulting 
and Clinical Psychology, 76, 231–242. doi:10.1037/0022-
006x.76.2.231
Kremers, I. P., Spinhoven, P., Van der Does, A. J. W., & Van 
Dyck, R. (2006). Social problem solving, autobiographical 
memory and future specificity in outpatients with borderline 
personality disorder. Clinical Psychology & Psychotherapy, 
13, 131–137.
Kubany, E. S., Leisen, M. B., Kaplan, A. S., Watson, S. B., Haynes, 
S. N., Owens, J. A., & Burns, K. (2000). Development and 
preliminary validation of a brief broad-spectrum measure of 
trauma exposure: The Traumatic Life Events Questionnaire. 
Psychological Assessment, 12, 210–224. doi:10.1037/1040-
3590.12.2.210
Kuyken, W., & Brewin, C. R. (1995). Autobiographical memory 
functioning in depression and reports of early abuse. Journal 
of Abnormal Psychology, 104, 585–591. doi:10.1037/0021-
843x.104.4.585
MacCallum, F. & Bryant, R. A. (2011a). Autobiographical mem-
ory following cognitive behaviour therapy for compli-
cated grief. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental 
Psychiatry, 42, 26–31. doi:10.1016/j.btep.2010.08.006.
MacCallum, F. & Bryant, R. A. (2011b). Imagining the future 
in complicated grief. Depression and Anxiety, 28, 658–665.
McNally, R. (2006). Cognitive abnormalities in post-traumatic 
stress disorder. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10, 271–277.
McNally, R., Litz, B., Prassas, A., Shin, L., & Weathers, F. (1994). 
Emotional priming of autobiographical memory in post-
traumatic stress disorder. Cognition and Emotion, 8, 351–
367.
McNally, R. J., Lasko, N. B., Macklin, M. L., & Pitman, R. K. 
(1995). Autobiographical memory disturbance in combat-
related posttraumatic stress disorder. Behaviour Research 
and Therapy, 33, 619–630.
Moore, S., & Zoellner, L. (2007). Overgeneral autobiographi-
cal memory and traumatic events: An evaluative review. 
Psychological Bulletin, 133, 419–437.
Nelson, H. E. (1982). National Adult Reading Test. Windsor, 
UK: NFER-Nelson.
Neshat-Doost, H. T., Dalgleish, T., Yule, W., Kalantari, M., 
Ahmadi, J., Dyregrov, A., & Jobson, L. (2013). Enhancing 
autobiographical memory specificity through cognitive 
training: An intervention for depression translated from 
basic science. Clinical Psychological Science, 1, 84–92.
Schacter, D. L., Addis, D. R., & Buckner, R. L. (2007). 
Remembering the past to imagine the future: The prospec-
tive brain. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 8, 657–661.
Schönfeld, S., & Ehlers, A. (2006). Overgeneral memory extends 
to pictorial retrieval cues and correlates with cognitive fea-
tures in posttraumatic stress disorder. Emotion, 6, 611–621. 
doi:10.1037/1528-3542.6.4.611
Serrano, J. D., Latorre, J. M., Gatz, M., & Montanes, J. (2004). Life 
review therapy using autobiographical retrieval practice for 
older adults with depressive symptomatology. Psychology 
and Aging, 19, 272–277.
Szpunar, K. K., Watson, J. M., & McDermott, K. B. (2007). 
Neural substrates of envisioning the future. Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America, 104, 642–647.
Tulving, E. (2002). Episodic memory: From mind to brain. 
Annual Review of Psychology, 53, 1–25. doi:10.1146/
annurev.psych.53.100901.135114
Watkins, E. R., Baeyens, C. B., & Read, R. (2009). Concreteness 
training reduces dysphoria: Proof-of-principle for repeated 
cognitive bias modification in depression. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 118, 55–64.
 at University College London on July 28, 2015cpx.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Episodic Future Thinking in PTSD 173
Williams, J. M. G. (1996). Depression and the specificity of auto-
biographical memory. In D. C. Rubin (Ed.), Remembering 
our past: Studies in autobiographical memory (pp. 244–
267). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Williams, J. M., Barnhofer, T., Crane, C., Herman, D., Raes, 
F., Watkins, E., & Dalgleish, T. (2007). Autobiographical 
memory specificity and emotional disorder. Psychological 
Bulletin, 133, 122–148.
 at University College London on July 28, 2015cpx.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
